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Research aim
The story of the Second World War has been told from many viewpoints in the 
Hungarian special literature. However, these writings mostly point out the events 
that happened in 1942, or the following years. They especially emphasize the de­
ployment of the 2nd Hungarian Army in 1942/43, and also the battles in that took 
place in Hungary in 1944-45. Obviously, this is because these are the most signifi­
cant and spectacular Hungarian participations in the war, and these are the well- 
known topics. It is remarkable, that these topics were highlighted also in the soci­
alist era, even though in a different context. The defeat at Don is portrayed as the 
biggest tragedy in the Hungarian military since Mohacs in 1526, and of course it 
was used as a reason to criticize the Horthy administration. Another reason for 
highlighting these events was the Red Army's liberating operations during 1944- 
45. Still, numerous subtopics have remained undiscovered. I consider the question 
of the Army's mobile branch is one of this kind.
This subject is not only interesting because of the historical point of view. The 
speed, the quick reaction and the logistical connections between these are all very 
important aspects in modern day's military. In a military action, the theory of "to 
the right place at the right time" is just as important as the size and strength of the 
deployed forces. Another question of current concern is the coalition warfare that 
is important to point out with its historical proofs. The role of the Hungarian Royal 
Army in the Second World War cannot be interpreted without analyzing all the 
events preceding it. This is true for my chosen topic as well. My aims are:
• To introduce and evaluate the Hungarian Royal Army's newest and most 
modem branch of arms and its functions
• To introduce and evaluate the experiences that were gained during the de­
ployment, and the conclusions that were drawn back then
• to complete and refine the image that is portrayed about the Army -  this 
image only points out the out-of-date, conservative characteristics of the 
Army's mentality and material conditions. I would like to set a contrast 
with this image and the actual organizational and theoretical progress that 
they have reached.
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• to illustrate the theoretical and practical efforts that were taken in order to 
create a modern branch of arms.
• to prove that in Hungary, the changes of the military theories were follo­
wed with attention.
The present dissertation is not going to discuss the armament and military 
technology of the motorized brigades in details. Neither military technology and 
apparatus, nor technical background of development will be analyzed rigorously, 
only their most important features will be described. The thesis will indeed briefly 
summarize the chronology and foreign policy in order to make the events of war­
fare comprehensible.
Research Methods
The methods that I used were influenced by my research objectives. There are ple­
nty of available sources, but most of them deal with the question briefly or they 
are summaries, or their main subject is military techniques. Some sources must be 
examined with criticism because they are bearers of special characteristics of the 
time they were written. Throughout my research, I processed the available prima­
ry and secondary sources by using the methods of analysis and synthesis.
Researchers who aim to examine the early history of Hungarian motorized 
brigades between 1938 and 1941 will encounter several difficulties. First of all, 
Hungarian historiography still wants monographs in this topic; therefore compo­
site works have to be consulted for extracting the necessary information. Works 
and monographs covering the history of the Royal Hungarian Army mainly con­
centrate on the period from 1941 to 1945, and the pre-1941 era is referred to con­
cisely.
Although there are some secondary sources that deal with the period ment­
ioned above, they usually intend to analyze a subtopic. Despite of being quality 
works, they can be seen as textbooks or pieces of popular science, rather than 
academic essays. In addition, there are no comprehensive studies on the history 
of contemporary weapons used by the Royal Hungarian Army. However, in the 
examination of motorized brigades the histories of separate units, that constituted 
a popular genre of Hungarian historiography in the past and reappeared after the 
political transition in 1989, play a more significant role. The recent works on unit 
history enable to get a more detailed picture of armored vehicles.
The lack of primary sources probably accounts for the deficiency in historiog­
raphy, as the majority of the archives were lost in the World War II. Since the re­
cords concerning military operations were also destroyed, the investigation gets 
even more difficult. The surviving material is currently stored in the Military Ar­
chives, of which the documents produced by the chief of general staff of the Royal 
Hungarian Army are extremely valuable. Unfortunately, these files were preser­
ved partially, and they are now classified into the first main group of fonds.
TTie 3b section of the Ministry of Defence was responsible for armored and ot­
her military vehicles, so its official papers can be the source of collecting financial 
and technical data.
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The registers of the Royal Hungarian Army and the Royal Hungarian Gen­
darmerie, which belong to the second main group of fonds (regional authorities, 
units), were seriously damaged as well. The extant records of army corps and ot­
her divisions, documents of military leadership of both higher and lower ranks are 
also very limited in number.
For interpretation of military operations some specific sources, the recommen­
dations for military awards and decorations can be a useful help. These docu­
ments described the war accomplishments or the feat of arms as an explanation 
for the proposal, and in this way they contribute to the reconstruction of military 
events which would be otherwise complicated in the absence of military bulletins 
and unit records.
As supplements of the investigation, personal data of army officers can be 
added from the Officers' Identity and Birth Certificates, Army History Sheets 
fond ("Tiszti személyügyi és anyakönyvi lapok, minősítési táblázatok") of the 
first main group of fonds.
The memoirs of war witnesses are conserved in the Studies Collection ("Ta­
nulmánygyűjtemény") fond of the seventh main group of fonds. Despite the sub­
jectivity of these accounts, they provide the researchers with useful pieces of ad­
ditional information.
The issues of the monthly journal "Magyar Katonai Szemle" published bet­
ween 1931 and 1944 were of primary importance in course of the research. The 
articles, reports and war stories released in the Szemle reflect the contemporary 
viewpoints of Hungarian military personnel. Furthermore, descriptions of diffe­
rent weapon types and the situation of armed units were included in the publica­
tions as well.
Description of Survey
Besides the Introduction and Conclusion, the paper has three main chapters. In 
the first chapter, I describe the circumstances and military trends that determined 
and influenced the birth and evolution of the new branch of arms. Here, I review 
the international and national tendencies and events that preceded the transfor­
mation of the army in 1938. I tend to introduce that the Hungarian innovations 
were carried out based on a thorough theoretical background and knowing all the 
foreign tendencies.
The following two main chapters (4 subchapters) will explain how the theories 
were turned into practice through the deployment of the mobile forces, and what 
conclusions can be drawn from these operations.
The parts about the occupation of Felvidék and Northern Transylvania are 
shorter on purpose, than the parts introducing the operations in Kárpátalja and 
Délvidék. This is because only the latter mentioned locations gave place to concre­
te military actions, while to the North and the East, they made successes by using 
the tools of diplomacy. However, during these actions to Kárpátalja and Délvidék, 
the participation of the Hungarian forces was rather limited. At Kárpátalja, the op­
posing forces -or perhaps the lack of them -, were the ones who saved the Hunga­
rian forces from a bloody battle, while at Délvidék, it was the German army and
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their successes that helped out the Hungarians.
In the chapter entitled The Occupation of Felvidék, I introduce the mobile 
formations in their first stages. This is especially true for the Second Motorized 
Brigade, whose formation was just in progress. In Kárpátalja, the mobile forces 
were already in combat environment. The units without any established human 
and material conditions were doing well in these limited war circumstances. The 
experiences after the march-in had shown though, that they need some serious 
improvements. One important experience is that the mobile strategic formation 
needs a unified leadership. This brought the Mobile Army Corps into existence.
The reoccupation of Northern Transylvania proved and helped the military le­
adership to realize that the Mobile Army Corps is not ready yet to fulfill most of 
the tasks that were meant for them. The experiences during the action and -  if a 
Hungarian-Romanian war occurs -, the potentials of the Romanian Army showed, 
that the mobile forces are still not armed sufficiently and they are far from being 
able to complete the tasks determined by the Field Manual.
I reveal the conditions of the deployment in details in the chapter titled Ope­
ration at Délvidék. I delineate the forces of the opposing armies, the geographical 
conditions and their war plans. Based on this, I will locate the operations of the 
Mobile Army Corps and prove that the mobile forces, with their current organiza­
tion, equipment and training are still deployable only in a limited way, compared 
to their requirements. There are serious lacks in basic parameters which have not 
been repaired yet (proved by previous experiences).
Summary -  A general overview about the actions of the 
mobile forces
The Hungarian Royal army had realized soon that between the two world wars 
there was a new military theory created that could actually be useful. In the 1930s, 
there were already theories that served as the basis of the deployment of the new 
branches of arms in the 2nd World War. The reason for the basic changes was the 
motorization and the military changes that came up with it.1 By end of the decade, 
the armor, automobile and aircraft techniques have developed enough to put the­
se theories into practice more generally. There were many factors hindering Hun­
gary's armament. One of them was that the country was bound by the Treaty of 
Trianon. Furthermore, the economic and personal background was unsatisfactory. 
By the end of the 30s, these factors began to take a positive turn, and in 1938, a vast 
armament program had begun. This is how the mobile branch was formed. This 
new branch of arms was dealing with all the growing pains that the newly reorga­
nized Army also had, and due to its characteristics, it had other problems as well.
The mobile forces that had been set up in 1938, first got deployed during the 
occupation of Felvidék. The actions of these barely organized formations only 
slightly exceeded the level of an army exercise. However, while recapturing Kár­
1 Obviously, we can also list several other outstanding results of other fields (electron­
ics, broadcasting, chemical industry, mining, etc.), but the key for innovation is defi­
nitely the appearance and spread of a new source of energy.
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pátalja, there were concrete military actions. The forces did not have the optimal 
organizational, human and material conditions, and they did not even get the 
chance to be deployed accordingly to the modem tactical theories either. Even 
though the units of recruits were doing well, it was still in doubt whether they can 
carry through the planned operations in case of organized resistance. Their trai­
ning and their material supplies were not satisfactory either.
Based on the experiences, the creation of the Mobile Army Corps in order to 
command the mobile strategic formations did not only mean an organized and 
professional leadership in a possible operation, but it also served as a peacetime 
commander and a head of the trainings as well. This made it possible to create and 
apply the required and unified principles, and also to prepare the commanders to 
lead the army based on these new rules. It became clear, that a new branch of arms 
cannot be maintained for "ad hoc" situations. They have to set up the mobile for­
ces already in peacetime with strong material and human conditions. From this 
point, they started to unify the motorized forces of the groups -  rather unsuccess­
fully, especially in case of the civil vehicles -, and started to provide the armored 
units much more modern army vehicles than the previous ones. (Csaba armored 
car, Toldi light tank, Nimród antitank vehicle, Túrán medium tank).
At the time of the Hungarian-Romanian "almost-war" in 1940, the Hungarian 
strategy was ready to fulfill the orders of the Mobile Army Corps's Regulation. Af­
ter breaking through the Romanian defense, the mobile formations were suppo­
sed to act in the depth of the Romanian defense. The war did not happen, and the 
only thing the groups had to fight with was a peaceful march-in, same as it went 
in Felvidék. Here, the enemy was not really the Romanian force, but the big march 
distances and circumstances. The mobile units, that were presenting much more 
significant marches than some other groups, still had to deal with numerous prob­
lems, that would have influenced badly their efficiency in war circumstances. The 
supplementary shipment had often got left behind, and the signal unit network 
was not satisfactory either. The shortage in vehicles and horses caused a lot of los­
ses to many formations, without even getting involved into a battle.
The German victories meant a lot of important experiences. This could convin­
ce the doubters, that motorizing means the future for the army, and not the astray. 
Moreover, they also confirmed the deployment theories bom before the war. The 
campaigns to Poland and to the West had justified the importance of the armored 
battalions, but because they did not have any war experience on their own, they 
assigned new ways of improvement as well. After this, they started to organize 
the armored battalions, and to improve the armament of the units. However, these 
ambitions had to fit to the country's potentials. It was obvious, that the Germans 
served as an example for a lot of reasons, but -  as a report refers to it -  they cannot 
be copied. There are basic differences in the German requirements regarding not 
only the economical, technical and personal abilities, but also the army's possible 
deployment conditions.
In April 1941, the Army got deployed again. The campaign to Délvidék was 
now a coalition war, with all the benefits of a powerful alliance. The soldiers did 
not confront any organized opposing forces now either, but had problems dealing 
with the irregular forces. And, of course, the usual problems came up again. The
2 4 2
Gábor Ferenc Kiss
poor supplementary shipment, the untrained soldiers, the imperfect material cir­
cumstances, the problematic commanding were all problems the attacking groups 
had to deal with. Earlier, diplomacy was the reason for not confronting the enemy, 
but now the reason was that the Hungarian forces did not encounter any signifi­
cant resistance by the time they took off, with the help of the German ground-and 
air forces. Thus, the Army did not get the chance to be tested in war circumstan­
ces again, the trial did not happen now either. They were not missing the military 
experiences though, even if they were incomplete. But they did not have enough 
time to solve their problems, because after Délvidék, the Mobile Army Corps got 
deployed again. But this time, they were in a "one weak against two strong" situa­
tion. Now, they had to pay with blood for their weak techniques, for neglecting the 
developments and cutting back costs for no reasons.
New academic results
In my dissertation, I pointed out that the Hungarian military innovators were 
constantly following the international tendencies with attention, and I introduced 
and evaluated the development of the mobile forces.
The Hungarian military commanders did not only view the events of the Se­
cond World War as war-experiences, but they also analyzed them, and while in­
novating and deploying the mobile forces, they always took these experiences into 
account in a modern way.
I summarized the story of the Hungarian Army's mobile forces between 1938 
and 1941 based on their deployments and the conclusions that can be drawn from 
them. Alongside with the deployments, I also introduced the ideas and processes 
of the developments.
As opposed to many labeling statements about the Hungarian Army, we can 
say that the leadership of the Army had reached the current standards of its time. 
(Despite the problems coming up in the material and technical conditions, we can 
tell that the Hungarian mobile forces were representing more modern theories 
from many respects, than other, opposing forces of their level). It had also tur­
ned out, that the theoretical preparedness was not always supported by practical 
knowledge.
Further research objectives
In the future, I plan to complete my work with a broad overview of the material 
conditions of the mobile forces, especially comparing their characteristics with the 
equipments of the existing and possible enemies. Besides introducing the arms 
and equipments, it would also be important to collect the officers of the groups. 
Regarding each type of groups, it would be necessary to do a more detailed resear­
ch, focusing on their equipment, tactics and human background.
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Practical usage of the scientific achievements
The dissertation can be used in teaching history in general, helping to refine the 
stereotypical thinking about the mobile forces. It can also have a role in teaching 
military history. It can be useful for the field officers as well. The historical analy­
ses are also helpful for the current military leaders. The methods of commanding 
the operations, cooperating with the allies are current and actual questions.
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